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The United States and other nations rely on consumer choice and price competition among competing
health plans to allocate resources in the health sector. A great deal of research has examined the efficiency
consequences of adverse selection in health insurance markets, less attention has been devoted to other
aspects of consumer choice. The nation of Switzerland offers a unique opportunity to study price competition
in health insurance markets. Switzerland regulates health insurance markets with the aim of minimizing
adverse selection and encouraging strong price competition. We examine consumer responses to price
differences in local markets and the degree of price variation in local markets. Using both survey data
and observations on local markets we obtain evidence suggesting that as the number of choices offered
to individuals grow their willingness to switch plans given a set of price dispersion differences declines
allowing large price differences for relatively homogeneous products to persist. We consider explanations
for this phenomenon from economics and psychology.
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The U.S. and other nations rely on consumer choice and price competition 
among competing health insurance plans to allocate resources in the health sector. 
There is an efficiency impulse to offer larger numbers of choices and greater variety 
of health insurance products. Expanded choices also carry efficiency problems in the 
form of adverse selection even if choices in health plans also result in price 
competition (Cutler and Reber, 1998). The nation of Switzerland offers a unique 
opportunity to study price competition in health insurance markets. Switzerland 
requires all residents to have health insurance. The government regulates the terms 
of competition so as to encourage price competition and minimize adverse selection. 
This is accomplished by defining a standard benefit for the mandated individual 
coverage, prohibiting insurers from turning away potential enrollees, providing 
extensive public information on prices, and risk adjusting payments to insurers.  
Households face the full price of coverage and may also purchase supplementary 
coverage and many do. Swiss residents all face opportunities to purchase coverage 
from at least 35 different sellers. In principle such a set of market arrangements 
might be expected to lead to active price competition. Yet Swiss health insurance 
markets are characterized by large and persistent price differences in local markets 
and little consumer switching between plans offering different prices.  This has been 
the case even during a period of expanding choice in local health insurance markets. 
These market outcomes contrast sharply from simple models of consumer 
behavior and competitive markets. We therefore explore several explanations of 
consumers’ health plan switching behavior.  Specifically, we focus on the response 
of consumers to an expanding health insurance choice set. We make use of panel 4 
data based on Swiss health insurance markets and a survey of insured individuals to 
explore switching behavior and consumer satisfaction with health insurance. 
The paper is organized into six sections. Following the introduction, the 
second section describes the market for health insurance in Switzerland and reports 
some basic facts about the market with respect to the amount of choice, consumer 
mobility and price patterns. The third section explores explanations for the apparent 
disconnect between what the standard competitive model would lead one to expect 
and the observed outcomes. The fourth section describes the empirical analysis 
aimed at producing evidence to assess the proposed explanations. Results are 
reported in the fifth section. Concluding remarks are made in the final section of the 
paper. 
II. Background 
A.  Swiss Health Insurance Markets: Regulatory Framework 
Switzerland, a country of 7.4 million inhabitants, is divided into 26 Cantons. 
The organization of the health care system is the responsibility of individual Cantons, 
The health care system is regulated by the Federal Law on Social Health Insurance 
(LAMal). The LAMal has been in force since 1996 after it was ratified in a popular 
referendum in 1994.  
The main regulatory features of Swiss health insurance markets are as 
follows. 1) An individual mandate requires all residents to have health insurance 
coverage.
1. 2) A standardized basic benefit package that is very comprehensive 
covering outpatient and inpatient care, and services such as nursing home care. The 
level of cost sharing (deductible, coinsurance of 10% up to an annual ceiling) is 
defined by the law and is invariant across insurers.  3) Premiums are community-
                                                 
1 Note that each family member must contract on an individual basis. 5 
rated. That is, premiums can differ between health plans but, an insurer must offer 
uniform premium for people in the same age groups   (0-18, 19-25, and >25), in the 
same geographic area (78 regions, ie 3 per Canton), with the same type of 
coverage. Four types of basic health insurance are available. In 2003 the most 
frequent choice was for ordinary deductible health insurance (49.7%) followed by 
insurance plans with higher deductibles (42.0%).  Insurance with limited choice of 
providers (HMO-contracts) accounts for 8.2% of enrollees. Federal and Canton 
subsidies are available to low-income residents. In some Cantons means-tested 
subsidies are granted to over 40% of the population. 4) Health insurers must accept 
every applicant for basic insurance. There is an open enrollment opportunity every 
six months (June and December) in which individuals can switch insurance 
providers. 5) Premiums paid to health plans are risk adjusted.  Risk adjustment is 
based on location, gender and age.  
There is a clear-cut regulatory separation between basic statutory coverage 
and optional supplementary insurance. One can get basic and supplementary 
insurance from two different providers or from the same health insurance. 
Supplementary insurance is not regulated by LAMal. Insurance Contract Law (LCA) 
regulates it. In the supplementary insurance market, insurers may refuse bad risks 
and offer risk-rated premiums.  
These features suggest that changing health insurers for basic coverage 
involves very low switching costs. Indeed, the basic insurance coverage is virtually 
identical from one health insurer to the other, and the enrollee generally can remain 
with the same physician or hospital.  Furthermore, the actual switching procedure is 
simple: it requires the individual to write a letter (prototypes are downloadable from a 
well known website) to their health insurer. Search costs are low. All premiums are 6 
officially published every year by the Federal Office for Public Health (OFSP) and 
distributed to households that request them. Furthermore, the most competitive 
premiums can be easily found on the Internet and in newspapers.   
In a health insurance market with community-rated premiums for each health 
plan, homogenous benefits, open enrollment and low switching costs, individuals 
would be expected to migrate toward the insurance plans offering the lowest 
premiums. Premium differences across insurance plans would be expected to be 
very small. The observed facts depart from these expectations. 
B. Stylized Facts on Market Performance 
i. Market Structure 
In the aggregate the number of health insurers (all non profit) that offer 
mandatory health care insurance decreased over the past decade. In 1994 there 
were 178 authorized health insurers operating; by 2004, there were only 92 insurers 
(Statistics in Health Insurance, OFSP, 2004, Table 8.01).   
At the Canton level where the competition takes place, the individual choice 
set has increased over the same period (Table 1).  In 1998 the mean number of 
health plans per Canton was 39 (range: 36 – 49); Consumers could choose among 
more than 40 health plans in only 2 Cantons. The mean number of health plans per 
Canton rose to 52 in 2003 (range: 41 – 70); in 8 Cantons, more than 55 insurers 
were providing individuals with basic insurance.
2   
 
 
                                                 
2 A look at the 6 largest health plans reveals that the group as a whole was stable 
from 1998 to 2004.  About 61% of enrollees were enrolled with these 6 companies in 
1998. After a slight decline between 1998 and 2004, the 6 largest firms regained 
market share in 2005. 
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ii. Price Variability Over Time  
Price variability was high in 2004 (Figure 1). Figure 1 shows monthly price 
variability by Canton, the maximal difference in basic premiums for adults over 26 
(for full coverage and in a single geographical cell) was 2952 Swiss francs per year 
or about 80% of the average. In 2004, the average gain of switching for an enrollee 
insured with the biggest company CSS amounted to 621 Swiss Francs over the year 
(which constitutes an average 20% discount).  
We measure price variation by examining the mean differences across 
cantons of the average premium minus the minimum and the maximum minus the 
minimum premium.  These are reported on Table 2 for the years 1997-2004.  Table 
2 shows little evidence of price convergence over time as competition at the Canton 
level has intensified.    
iii. Switching Behavior 
Annual switching percentages are relatively low given the price differentials 
for identical benefit packages. Health insurance switching rates were 4.8% in 1997, 
5.4% in 1998, 2.7% in 1999 and 2.1% in 2000 according to household survey data 
(OFAS, 2001). Yearly switching rates have recently stabilized at around 3% (Le 
Temps, 2005).  
III. Explanations 
A.  The Expected Utility Model 
In assessing the low rates of switching in the presence of substantial 
opportunities to realize lower premiums for what appear to be homogeneous health 
plans, we begin by considering how standard market models address such facts. 
The standard economic model of consumer choice under uncertainty assumes that 
consumers maximize their expected utility.  Given a set of N choices an individual 8 
will choose a health plan if its expected utility is greater than that of each of the 
alternatives.  To reach normative conclusions the theory additionally requires that 
consumers can secure reliable information about the quality of each of the 
alternatives.  
Once a plan is chosen a consumer may experience a change in health state 
or other personal circumstances (e.g. reduced income) or face a new set of premium 
choices due to health plan entry. These altered circumstances may result in the 
individual reassessing the expected utility of their health plan relative to available 
alternatives. Standard theory recognizes that consumer search is costly.  Rational 
consumers search individually until the costs of additional searching outweigh its 
expected benefits. Deciding to switch therefore requires the beneficiary to learn 
about the alternatives, and if plans look potentially more attractive, the beneficiary 
must anticipate needing to learn about each plan’s policies and procedures. 
  Switching costs can produce a relationship between increased competition 
in the form of an increased number of sellers and price dispersion if an increase in 
the number of sellers causes an increase in consumer search costs and results in 
fewer searches. This would happen within an industry that sells differentiated 
products. Janssen and Moraga-Gonzales (2004) show that the impact of an increase 
in the number of sellers depends on the consumers’ search intensity. When 
consumers search with low intensity, an increase in the number of firms reduces 
search, does not affect expected price and leads to greater price dispersion. 
Alternatively when consumers search with high intensity, increased numbers of 
competitors results in more searching and lower prices if the number of competitors 
in the market is low to begin with. However, if the number of firms is initially large 
increased numbers of firms causes less search and higher prices. 9 
  Price variability may also increase with the number of sellers in settings 
where there is heterogeneity among consumers (informed versus uniformed, price 
sensitive versus less price sensitive consumers). Varian (1980) examines a setting in 
which the demand is driven by two classes of buyers: informed and uninformed 
consumers. The Varian model predicts that the range of prices is greater when the 
number of sellers is higher. However, this model does not necessarily imply less 
switching. 
  Finally, there is another line of literature that generates price dispersion 
based on models of price discrimination (Borenstein and Rose, 1994). The 
institutional context in Swiss health insurance markets limits the applicability of the 
price discrimination approach. 
  In Switzerland during the period observed (1997-2000) the size of the choice 
set in local markets grew, the population aged and dissemination of information on 
price and quality improved.  All of these changes might be expected to result in 
switching between health plans.  During a period of expanding choice, the likelihood 
that there is a preferable alternative to an individual’s existing health plan increases 
as do potential search costs.  In the Swiss context, search costs may be less 
important than elsewhere because insurance product characteristics are closely 
regulated and price information is widely available. In addition one source of 
switching cost common in the U.S. the link between one’s health plan and one’s 
physician is essentially non-existent in Switzerland where only 8% of people are in 
health plans that restrict provider choice (Niepp and Zeckhauser, 1985).  In fact one 
recent study of consumer mobility in Europe found that switch costs are rather low in 
Switzerland (Laske-Alderschof et al, 2004).  Thus if there is an increase in the choice 10 
set  alongside substantial price variation and relatively low search costs it is 
somewhat surprising to see low and declining switching rates.   
  The Swiss regulatory structure and the fee for service-indemnity insurance 
serve to reduce many aspects of service quality variation. Some quality variation no 
doubt remains. One variable dimension of quality may be the reliability of the health 
plans. Health plans have entered and left the market in recent years. Research on 
choice of health plans in American health insurance markets shows quite limited 
effects on choice or switching of measured (but unregulated) quality differences 
between health plans 
The implications of the expected utility model for empirical analysis of 
switching behavior is that right hand side variables would include measures of 
relative premiums, enrollee health status and personal circumstances, and 
potentially some measures of plan characteristics, their administrative effort and 
financial stability. 
B. Decision Overload 
The standard model faces the most challenges when applied to complex, 
high-stakes choices such as those involving health care and investment decisions. 
.Research in economics and psychology questions whether more choice is always in 
consumers’ interests.  Too much choice can inhibit consumers from making any 
choice.  Particularly when choice involves health and money – and both are 
obviously part of choice of health insurance – consumers facing many choices may 
revert to the status quo even if superior options are available (Kunreuther et al, 
2002).   
Two underlying forces have been suggested as explanation for increased 
choice inhibiting consumer switching. These are related to the limited ability of 11 
individuals to process information and to regret or the fear of making errors in what 
are seen as high stakes decisions. The information or cognitive overload theory 
argues that as the choice set grows there are increasing costs to an individual of 
processing information (Eppler and Mengis, 2003).  This happens if individuals 
continue to consider all alternatives as the choice set expands.  Even if short cuts 
are used (elimination of the worst alternative) information processing costs grow with 
the choice set.  This leads to the hypothesis that consumers can be overwhelmed by 
“too much” choice (Huffman and Kahn 1998; Iyengar and Lepper, 2000.)  The result 
is an expected relationship between the size of a choice set and the quality of 
decision-making that is an inverted U. The second psychological force concerns the 
fear of making an incorrect choice or regret. In situations where decisions are 
complex, consequential and uncertain there is often fear of making the wrong 
decision and later suffering regrets. One set of responses to such decision-making 
circumstances that have been observed in both experimental and observational 
studies is a tendency towards decision avoidance by either opting for the status quo 
or walking away from the decision entirely (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988; 
Schwartz, 2005; Shafir, Simonson and Tversky, 1993) 
One set of experimental results by Iyengar and Lepper (2000) show that as 
the number of choices expands people will be less likely to take action and, say, 
make a purchase. This result is consistent with other research showing that a type of 
“analysis paralysis” takes hold when information and choices becomes very complex 
(Bawden, 2001, Cowan, 2001).One set of studies that is particularly relevant to the 
Swiss Health insurance context come from studies of 401(k) plans.  Iyengar, 
Huberman and Jiang (2004) show that participation in 401(k) plans increases 
significantly when the number of funds offered decreases from 60 to less than thirty 12 
and again when fund offerings fall below 10. In the health insurance context a study 
by Elbel and Schlesinger (2006) studied insurance choice in the U.S. Medicare 
program. In that program there are increasing numbers of choices and the choices 
are highly heterogeneous. Using survey data from Medicare beneficiaries, Elbel and 
Schlesinger studied the impact of the number of plans on the likelihood that 
individuals would leave the traditional Medicare program in favor of private health 
plans (paid for by the government). They found that switching is more likely as the 
number of choices rises up to four and then it begins to decline.  They also showed 
that, after four choices, beneficiaries put no further effort into considering health plan 
options.  The implication is that more choice and greater complexity of choice after a 
point will inhibit action and reduce the quality of decisions that are made. 
C. Status Quo Bias 
Thaler (1980) identified a general tendency of people to exaggerate the value 
of an item they possess (selling price) relative to what they would value the same 
item if they did not own it (buying price). This has been termed the endowment effect 
and it stems from the idea of loss aversion (Tversky and Kahneman 1991).  Loss 
aversion has also been associated with an attachment to the status quo.  In an 
environment of uncertainty and decision complexity it is hypothesized that there is a 
tendency to exaggerate the disadvantages of departing from current arrangements 
and to understate potential gains.  Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) have explored 
this phenomenon in the context of health insurance markets and report support for 
what they term status quo bias in decision making.  They studied health plan choices 
as new health insurance products were introduced into the Harvard University 
employee benefit plan. They argued that traditional consumer theory suggests that, 
ceteris paribus, newer faculty (holding constant age) and those with longer tenures 13 
should display a similar pattern of choices. Yet the data showed that established 
faculty members were more likely to enroll in health plans that had existed prior to 
the new offerings than faculty with shorter periods of attachment to any health 
insurance plan. They interpreted this as support for the existence of a status quo 
bias. 
3 
D. Distinguishing Between Explanations 
If search costs are low then the number of choices available to consumers in 
the market would typically not explain much about switching behavior in the 
expected utility model. In the expected utility model with low search costs the 
number of choices works primarily through premium and quality. A model based on 
ideas about decision overload and regret would include a measure of the number of 
choice available to consumers. The decision overload hypothesis suggests a 
negative relation between switching and the number of choices above a certain 
number of choices (the inverted U).  The experiences in the 401(k) market suggest 
that as choices grow beyond 10 and also beyond 30-60 there are reductions in 
consumer responses. The evidence from Medicare suggests a lower threshold albeit 
with heterogeneous products. In practice, since service quality is likely to be 
incompletely measured, a negative relationship between switching rates and number 
of choices could occur because the number of choices may serve as a proxy for the 
ability of consumers to find better preference-quality-price matches. In an expected 
utility model, if prices are well measured and most variation in quality is either 
eliminated by regulation or measured by indicators of plan administrative effort or 
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plan switching in response to price changes was lower for incumbent enrollees of 
health plans other factors constant.  They also interpreted this finding as evidence in 
support of a status quo bias.  
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financial reserves then the number of choices to add little explanatory power to a 
model of switching behavior. 
The expected utility model allows for some learning about how health plans 
serve consumers, which might result in switching behavior. These learning effects 
might be expected to occur within a year or two of enrollment. Beyond that the 
expected utility framework would not include tenure of enrollment to explain health 
plan switching. The status quo bias model implies that longer tenures of enrollment 
should continuously reduced the likelihood of switching other things equal. 
IV- Empirical Implementation  
We empirically examine the roles of price, information overload and status 
quo bias in explaining the switching rates between insurance plans operating in 
individual Swiss insurance markets. 
A. Overview  of  Analysis  Strategy 
Information overload may stem from the large number of competing health 
plans.  Even if health plans can be assessed easily and quickly due to publicly 
available information on prices the large number of alternatives is likely to make the 
choice process more burdensome. In our context, status quo bias is present when 
enrollees prefer their current plans to lower cost alternatives of comparable quality 
even when tangible switching costs are low.  
To examine these issues, we conduct the following specific analyses.  We 
examine: (i) factors associated with switching of health plans/ and the intent to switch 
plans (ii) plan distributions of old/ new enrollees and (iii) stated reasons for being 
enrolled with current health plans 
In our empirical analysis of plan switching, we focus on three main 
explanatory factors. First, we examine the monetary gains from plan switching or the 15 
influence of price differentials.  Second, we assess the impact of the number of 
competing health plans on health plan switching.  The variability in the number of 
choices across Cantons over time allows us to test whether more choice increases 
or decreases the likelihood that individuals will switch health plans. A finding that 
suggests that individuals facing larger numbers of alternative health plans are less 
likely to switch plans, other factors equal, would be most consistent with notions of 
information overload. That is, the number of plans is unlikely to be correlated with 
unmeasured quality differentials. We also control for the complexity of choice by 
controlling for the purchase of a supplementary insurance policy in addition to the 
basic package.
4 Third, we study the relationship between the duration of enrollment 
and switching behaviors in order to assess whether individuals stick with their current 
health plans though presumably superior alternatives (with respect to price) are 
available.  
The health plan choices of new enrollees (switchers) will be compared to plan 
choices of those who have maintained their previous plans (non switchers). 
Switchers should be relatively unencumbered by status quo bias.  If the pattern of 
plan choices for these two groups differ significantly this would be consistent with the 
presence of status quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988, Strombom, 
Buchmueller and Feldstein, 2002).  
Studying the stated reasons of enrollment in health plans at a point in time in 
surveys of health plan enrollees offers another window into factors that influence 
observed patterns of enrollment. Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) have 
emphasized that “anchoring” or “psychological commitment” underlying status quo 
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supplemental coverage from the same insurer.  We have not found any tangible 
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bias are likely to result from tradition, habit, sufficient satisfaction (as opposed to 
optimal choice), uncertainty toward alternatives, misperceptions or false beliefs 
concerning health plan characteristics. Sample surveys of Swiss health plan 
enrollees ask some questions related to the importance of such factors as reasons 
for health plan enrollment. 
B. Data 
We make use of two sources of data, a survey of individuals focusing on 
health plan choices in Switzerland and publicly reported information related to health 
insurance plans including premiums, number of enrollees and financial indicators 
(the level of reserves, and administrative costs). 
The OFAS Survey 
The survey that we use was conducted by the Federal Office for Social 
Insurance (OFAS) as part of the general assessment of the Law on Sickness 
Insurance (Art. 32 OAMal). The corresponding dataset was obtained from the Swiss 
Information and Data Archive Service (SIDOS). It includes observations from a 
sample of 2152 households representative of the Swiss population. One adult was 
interviewed by telephone in each household during the summer of 2000.  
This survey provides extensive information on health plan choice at the 
individual level. Respondents were requested to name their current health insurance 
plans for the basic and supplementary health insurance separately and to define 
their criteria for choosing plans. The options they chose (e.g. higher deductibles, 
HMO) for basic insurance and the composition of the supplementary benefit package 
were also reported. People were asked whether they had changed any of their 
health insurance contracts during the four previous years (1997 - 2000) and when 
they made changes. Consequently, switching behaviors were retrospectively 17 
reported over a four-year period. Note also that reporting of consumer choices 
started one year after the new health insurance policy was put into effect.  In 
addition, information on the intent to switch in the future as well as general 
satisfaction with their health insurance plans was collected. Knowledge, beliefs, 
attitudes and perceptions towards LAMal and health plans were also investigated.  
Socio-demographic characteristics as well as subjective health status were obtained 
in the survey.  A detailed descriptive analysis of these data is available in the OFAS 
report (2001) and in Colombo (2001). The data are structured as a panel dataset of 
switching behaviors including one observation per enrollee per year, over a four-year 
period. All variables except respondent gender, location, and educational attainment 
vary over time. 
The insurer database 
Our empirical models make use of information that describes health insurance 
markets over the period 1997-2000.  This includes information on the number of 
enrollees (denoted nict) and monthly adult premiums (Pict) that are reported at three 
levels: insurer (i), Canton (c) and year (t). Financial characteristics of the health 
plans such as the amount of reserves (rit) and the level of administrative spending 
(ait) are measured for each insurer by year.  
The number of enrollees per health plan is reported at the Canton level even 
though there are Cantons that consist of two or three different premium regions. To 
address this issue we use the (unweighted) average premium per health insurer for a 
Canton. In addition, the number of enrollees per health plan is not provided by type 
of contract even though there are discount for high deductible plans that differ from 
one health insurer to another. The premium for full coverage (ordinary deductible) is 
used as a proxy variable for the adult premium.  18 
The number of insured people in each plan was directly obtained from the 
Federal Office for Public Health (OFSP); yearly premiums are available on the OFSP 
website (http://www.bag.admin.ch/kv/statistik/f/index.ht). Financial characteristics of health 
plan are published yearly.  We have a total of 4685 observations on insurers (one 
observation per insurance company, per Canton, per year). 
For our purposes, this insurer information is used to compute the number of 
health plans by Canton-year, the number of enrollees, the average premium as well 
as indicators of premium variability. We make the connection between the OFAS 
survey and this insurer information by matching each individual health plan reported 
in the survey with the corresponding market information (premium, number of 
enrollees, reserves, administrative costs, market share) referring to the relevant year 
and Canton and by adding the data that we computed at the Canton level (number of 
operating funds, number of enrollees, premium variability).  
C. Estimation 
 
Estimation of a switching model 
 
We estimate a health plan-switching model.  We denote  nt y  the binary 
variable defined by  1 = nt y  if the individual n has switched during year t and  0 = nt y  
when he/she has not switched. The following basic model is estimated on the latent 
variable
*
nt y :  
( ) nt n t nt nt nt nt nt c year S O dp x y ε ρ α λ γ η β + + + + + + =
' *  
 
The decision to switch is given by:  
. 0 1
* ≥ = nt nt y if y                           
 
'
nt x  is a vector of both time-varying and time-invariant individual characteristics  
(age, gender, household size, education level, urban location, health status). The 19 
vector yeart represents a set of time fixed effects to account for expanded entry over 
time across Cantons among other trends. 
nt O  denotes the choice set facing an individual in year t (number of health 
plans in a Canton). Three main specifications were used: 1) A continuous variable 
representing the number of choices; 2) A vector of dummy variable measuring 
ranges in number of plans (eg. 35-49 plans, 50-55, 56-60, 61-71) which represents a 
more flexible functional form; 3) A single dummy variable with takes on a value of 
one for markets with 55 or more choices.  As we discussed above an enrollee may 
deal with large choice sets by creating subsets of options. This is a form of cognitive 
short cut that might be used to reduce information processing costs (Cowan 2001). 
An enrollee may not be considering all options. As local markets are quite 
concentrated, a large number of insurers are likely to be fringe players that may not 
figure into the decisions of many consumers.  We allow for this form of segmentation 
through an alternative specification that includes two plan count variables 
1
nt O  and
2
nt O  
. 
1
nt O , denotes the plans that have more than a 10% market share and 
2
nt O  the 
number of plans with less than 10% (Table 1b).  We also replaced the number of 
plans by the inverse of the Herfindahl index that indicates the “size equivalent” 
number of firms in the market (Table 1c). Choice overload is consistent with the 
inverse of the Herfindahl index being negatively associated with the probability of 
switching.  
We also treat the number of choices to be endogenous. If health plan are able 
to observe factors affecting switching not observable to the researcher and make 
entry choices accordingly then entry is endogenous. Canton fixed effects are 
included to capture unobserved time invariant heterogeneity. We also estimated an 
instrumental variables model of switching for the case of the continuous measure of 20 
plan choice. Instruments included the population of the Canton, the average income 
of the canton and the average premium in the canton during the prior year.   
nt dp) (  represents the potential gains from switching health plans. We measure 
nt dp) (  as the (weighted) standard deviation in health plan premiums within a Canton.  
This represents the expected difference in price one would experience if the typical 
person switched to the mean plan in a Canton.  This is one measure of potential 
financial gains from plan switching (Table 2).
5  We also estimate a model 
specification that includes interaction terms between the choice environment 
indicators, and the measure of price dispersion n dp) ( .  This enables us to examine 
differential price response in the five choice environments.  We also estimate models 
that include a measure of the number of new plans available to consumers during 
each period to allow both levels and changes in plan choice to affect switching 
behavior.   
nt S  takes on the value 1 when the individual has contracted a supplementary 
health insurance contract, a more complex choice situation. Furthermore, it is 
important to control for this variable because it might also capture the risk-selection 
practices that are still reported despite the existing regulation. In particular, it was 
highlighted that underwriting practices for supplemental policies might create an 
impediment to switch funds (Paolucci et al., 2007). In order to get rid of this effect, 
we run additional models excluding people with supplemental insurance.  
As the impact of vector Ont  on switching behavior might depend upon whether 
the individual has purchased supplementary insurance, the interaction between both 
variables will also be tested in additional models. The standard errors and 
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“price” measure. 21 
significance associated with the interaction terms in non-linear models will be 
computed according to the approach of Ai and Norton (2003).  However, note that 
the idea that those with supplemental insurance face a more complicated decision 
assumes that the decision to purchase supplemental insurance is independent of the 
decision of which basic and supplemental plan to purchase. In an additional 
specification, we test this assumption using a bivariate probit model that jointly 
estimates the factors affecting the decision to switch basic health plans and to 
subscribe to a supplementary contract.  
The structure of the data complicates the estimation of any status quo bias 
because the duration of enrollment is only known for the current health plan and not 
for any prior health plans. As a result we estimate models, where we use the 
declared intention to switch in the future as a dependent variable. Because attitudinal 
questions, such as intent to switch were only asked as prospective questions, the 
corresponding regressions were run a subsample of the dataset where t = 2000.  In 
that case the vector
'
n x  also includes the duration of enrollment in each respondent’s 
current health plan.  
nt ε  is a random disturbance that is assumed to follow a logistic distribution. 
Logit estimations are run on the cross section of 8608 observations.  We also run 
random effects logit models (Greene, 2001), thus taking into account the panel 
structure of the data (each individual being present during four periods).   
V- Results 
The main descriptive features of the survey are summarized in Table 3.  2152 
individuals took part in the survey. Of this sample, 73.8% of the respondents lived in 
areas with more than 50 competing health plans in 2000. During the period 1997-
2000, 15.2% switched from one health plan to another for the basic package. Except 22 
for six individuals, switchers switched only once during the period of analysis. In the 
year 2000, 9.9% reported intent to switch in the future.   
Switching rates proved to be significantly higher in areas with fewer plans 
than in the higher choice areas over the 4-year period. A similar pattern was 
observed for the intent to switch outcome.  The logit estimates for the plan switching 
models are reported on Table 4. The first five columns of Table 4 report a series of 
specifications using five different approaches to measuring the number of plans in a 
consumer’s choice set.  Column one reports estimates for the switching model where 
the total number of health plans is measured as a continuous variable.  That 
estimate indicates that cantons with more choices have significantly lower switching 
rates ceteris paribus.  Column two measures choice set size with a dummy variable 
for cantons offering 55 or more health plan choices.  The coefficient estimate is 
negative and significantly different from zero at conventional levels (p<0.05).  The 
magnitude of the estimate implies that people in cantons with more than 55 choices 
have relative odds of 0.65 of switching compared to those with fewer choices.  
Column three specifies a set of dummy variables measuring different choice set 
sizes.  Those results show a monotonically declining likelihood of switching with 
more choices.  The estimated coefficient for the dummy for 30-49 choice is positive 
and significantly different from zero compared to the reference group (50-55 
choices). The coefficient dummy for 61 or more choices relative to the reference 
group was negative and significantly different from zero.   
  Column four reports estimates from a model that allows consumers to view 
firms with a relatively large presence in the market differently from smaller fringe 
firms.  In this model both measures are continuous.  Note that both coefficient 
estimates are negative but only the coefficient estimate for the number of fringe firms 23 
is significantly different from zero.  Finally, we include the inverse Herfindahl index as 
our choice set size measure in column five.  The estimate coefficient for that variable 
is negative and significant at conventional levels.
6 
  Two other sets of coefficient estimates in columns 1-5 are important to note.  
The coefficient for the variable measuring relative price (dp) is consistently positive 
and significant suggesting that the larger the price differential between one’s own 
plan and other options the more likely a consumer is to switch their health plan.  The 
coefficient estimates while quite stable across specifications are not very precisely 
estimated in a number of models. 
Columns 6-11 of Table 4 report a series of models that take account of 
potential threats to the basic specifications in columns 1-5.  Column six reports the 
results of a re-estimation of the model in column 1 when people with supplementary 
coverage are dropped from the analysis file.  The estimated coefficient for the 
number of plans remains negative and significant.  The magnitude of the coefficient 
increased from -0.02 to -0.03.  Columns 7 treat the choice set measures from 
columns 1 and 2 as endogenous.  Using the F test proposed by Staiger and Stock 
(1997) we show that the instruments used in our IV models are not weak.
7  The 
results in columns 7 show that both coefficients for the choice set size measures 
                                                 
6 Since there was some instability in entry involving insurers with very low levels of 
enrollment (see Tables 1a and 1b) in two Cantons (GR and VS) the use of the 
Herfindahl index allows us to test the sensitivity of our findings taking to account 
enrollment size. We also re-estimated the models dropping the two Cantons and the 
results did not change materially (estimates available upon request). 
7 In order to assess the strength of the instruments that we use in type IV probit 
model, we estimated the corresponding IV linear probability model through 2SLS, 
thus being able to refer to the results that were developed for linear models (Staiger 
and Stock, 1997) (such results have not been worked out for IV probit yet).  Staiger 
and Stock (1997) suggest that the F statistics from the first stage regression should 
be computed.  An F statistics of 10 is the threshold for the strength of instruments.  
In our case, F=210, suggesting that our instruments meet the criteria for strong 
instruments of Staiger and Stock (1997). 24 
continue to be negative and significantly different from zero.  Columns 8 - 12 offer 
additional sensitivity analyses.  The resulting coefficient estimates for the size of the 
choice set  remain quite stable showing a negative and significant effect of more 
choices on the likelihood of switching health plans.  Column 8 incorporated the 
household size as a covariate. Column 9 indicates that when an individual holds 
supplemental insurance, more choice reduces the probability of switching health 
plans. Furthermore the bivariate probit model (joint estimation of the propensities to 
switch and to hold a supplementary contract) reported in column 11 suggests that we 
cannot reject exogeneity of supplemental coverage in the switching equation. The 
coefficient for supplemental coverage is never significant at conventional levels. 
Column 12 shows that the number of new plans decreases the likelihood of 
switching (holding constant the general time trend).
8 
We tested whether people that switched plans paid lower premiums than 
those that stayed in the same plan. Our estimates show that the adjusted monthly 
premium for switchers was 181 SF compared to 214.18 SF for those staying with the 
same plan. The difference of 33.18 or 15.9% was significant at conventional levels 
(t=6.05). This suggests that by not switching, consumers “left money on the table”. 
Table 5 reports results of several specifications of the logit model on a 
individual’s intent to switch health plans.   The estimated coefficients for the vector of 
dummy variables measuring the size of the choice set in each Canton showed a 
similar pattern of results to those found on Table 4.  In these models the coefficient 
estimates were more precise.  In general larger choice sets (above 50 choices) were 
                                                 
8 Note that in all random effects logit specifications of the switching model, the 
likelihood ratio test of rho = 0 suggests that individual unobserved heterogeneity is 
not significant. Consequently the panel data set is run as a cross section on a four-
year period in the regressions reported in Table 4. 
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associated with a significantly reduced likelihood of expressing intent to switch health 
plans. The estimated coefficient on the duration of enrollment in one’s current funds 
was negative and significant in all specifications.  This suggests that the longer one 
has been enrolled in a plan holding constant age and health status etc, the less likely 
one is to report an intent to switch health plans.. The results on price differences 
) (dp were similar magnitude and in some cases a bit less precisely estimated than in 
the switching regressions of Table 4. 
We consider whether indicators of health plan “quality” affected the results on 
intent to switch.  We included measures of administrative costs, and the size of the 
plan reserves.  Neither of these variables had coefficient estimates that were 
significantly different from zero.  Nor did we find any evidence that the estimated 
coefficients for the number of choices were affected by including these variables
9. 
We do, however, find some descriptive evidence from an analysis of switchers 
that is suggestive of some quality differences affecting choice behavior. Health plans 
with high reserves may seem more secure.  Thus, it is not surprising to find that 29% 
of switchers have opted for funds having reserves below the required level versus 
12% of non switchers (p<0.001).   
We investigate the impact of choice further by modeling the intent to switch 
among consumers expressing dissatisfaction with their health plan.  Consumers 
facing large numbers of health plan choices were less likely to express an intention 
to switch health plans even when they expressed dissatisfaction with their current 
health plan. Indeed, out of those who were very dissatisfied (answers 1-5 on a 1-10 
scale) 33.7% intended to switch plans in areas with less than 50 choices versus 
21.9% in areas with more than 50 choices (p<0.01, Chi
2).    
                                                 
9 Results are available from the authors 26 
Patterns of health plan choices among more recent choosers and the overall 
populations show that the distributions of plan choices differ significantly between 
switchers and non switchers. Table 6 reports the distributions over the 12 biggest 
sickness funds in 2000. and shows 59% of non-switchers compared to 23.7% of 
switchers were enrolled with one of the five major national plans (helsana, css, 
visana, konkordia, swica). Distributions of health plan choices by age groups show 
(Table 7), similar patterns with 61.2% of older non-switchers versus 21.1% of older 
switchers enrolling in large plans. For respondents younger than 35, the percentages 
are respectively 50.3% versus 26.5%. Switchers refer to people exercising choice 
and not those changing health plans exits.
10 
What are the reasons reported by enrollees for the observed patterns of 
enrollment?  Table 9 reveals that 40% of people choose a health plan following their 
parents’ and friends’ choices, and what they see as tradition. Furthermore, as many 
as 25% individuals declare that they do not strive to pick the health insurance plan 
with the lowest premium. A substantial number of people explicitly report staying with 
their health plan based on habit (13.5%) or because they are satisfied with their 
arrangement (79%)(Table 8).. As a test of whether people are possibly not searching 
for the lowest price we compare the prices obtained by those using an “agent” 
versus all others.  We find that those using agents pay on average 9% less for 
coverage (p<0.05) than all other enrollees.  
There appears to be considerable misunderstanding about what the basic 
rules of the health insurance markets are for consumers. For instance, 29% of 
individuals think that health plans charge different premiums to different age groups 
among adults for the basic package; 10% of individuals believe that sickness funds 
                                                 
10 Specifically, our results are not the result of the fact that Visana stopped 
operations in 8 Cantons in 1998 27 
can cream skim; 15% of individuals believe that they must purchase supplementary 
and basic insurance from the same carrier; and 10% think that they are allowed to 
change health plans only when the premium rises.   
VI. Concluding Observations 
The Swiss market for health insurance might be one where one would find 
high levels of price competition and active movement among health plans by 
consumers interested in securing the lowest prices for a standardized basic benefit 
package. Yet one observes low rates of switching persistently with high variation in 
premiums. These facts present a challenge to simple market models of health 
insurance. In this paper we raise the possibility that factors such as decision 
overload and status quo biases in decision making contributes to the observed 
behavior.  
We make use of data on consumer choice in Swiss health insurance markets 
to explore decision overload and status quo bias as explanations for behavior in 
those health insurance markets. Our findings offer a mixed picture of the impact of 
expanded choice on price competition in Swiss health insurance markets. We 
explored a variety of ways of characterizing the size of the choice set.  Results from 
the various model specifications point to a consistent finding that more choice serves 
to inhibit switching of health plans.  In one specification we allowed consumers to 
respond to fringe firms differently from those that were more significant actors in the 
local market.  There our results suggest that switching rates are largely driven by the 
number of “fringe” firms in the market. These results are quite consistent with the 
literature on 401(k) plans that show substantial effects on participation as the choice 
set grows to over 30 funds.  28 
Our econometric results indicate that people with longer periods of attachment 
to a particular health plans were less likely to express an intention to switch plans. 
Moreover, people making new health plan choices (switchers and those new to the 
market) chose to enroll in different health plans than those who had not switched in 
some time. Finally, when people are asked about why they have chosen their current 
plan –reasons related to habit, family tradition, and adequate performance by the 
health plan were noted. All of these reasons are consistent with inertia associated 
with status quo bias. 
The results for price response show strong consumer responses to price 
dispersion. That is, where price dispersion is larger and the gains from switching 
health plans are greatest consumers are most likely to switch. These results are 
consistent with standard market models. 
We uncover some evidence suggesting that consumers are making errors. 
First, we show that consumers that switch health plan pay 15% to 16% less in health 
insurance premiums per month holding ceteris paribus. Second, we show that 
among consumers expressing dissatisfaction with their health plans those in markets 
with fewer choices are more likely to express intent to switch.  Finally, consumers 
that used an agent to help them purchase insurance consistently paid significantly 
lower premiums. This set of results suggests that “mistakes may have been made”.  
One implication of these results is that expanding choice to very large 
numbers is likely to reduce the effectiveness of consumer decision-making which in 
turn may result in larger mark-ups by health insurers.  This is because expanded 
choice will weaken the relationship between enrollment in an individual health plan 
and the price concessions offered to consumers (Perloff and Salop 1985).  This is 29 
consistent with our finding on the link between number of choices and variation in 
prices. 
At a moment in history when elderly Americans are facing large numbers of 
choices in private health plans and prescription drug plans our findings may offer 
some cautions regarding the need for decision support and mechanisms that simplify 
such health insurance choices. 30 
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Table 1a: Number of health plans per canton over 1997- 2004  
 
canton 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 % enrollees
(2004)
AG (Aargau) 39 39 52 59 55 58 59 60 7.7%
AI 34 36 35 37 34 40 41 55 0.2%
AR 38 39 42 46 44 45 45 54 0.7%
BE (Bern) 38 39 54 59 57 59 59 57 13.0%
BL 38 39 49 51 50 51 54 56 3.6%
BS 39 39 49 52 51 51 54 56 2.4%
FR 39 39 51 55 54 53 53 54 3.4%
GE 38 39 49 50 48 48 49 50 5.4%
GL 38 39 45 46 45 48 51 57 0.5%
GR 71 49 59 56 54 53 56 61 2.6%
JU 37 38 42 44 45 45 43 49 0.9%
LU 38 39 51 54 56 56 58 58 4.8%
NE 38 39 45 49 46 47 48 49 2.3%
NW 38 37 42 41 42 42 44 56 0.5%
OW 38 39 44 45 44 45 47 55 0.5%
SG (St Gallen) 39 39 53 54 52 56 56 58 6.3%
SH 39 39 44 46 43 47 49 55 1.0%
SO 39 39 51 55 54 54 56 58 3.4%
SZ 39 39 49 51 50 53 54 59 1.8%
TG 39 39 48 50 46 47 51 54 3.1%
TI 38 38 46 50 50 53 53 51 4.3%
UR 37 36 39 42 42 42 44 57 0.5%
VD (Vaud) 39 38 51 52 51 51 51 50 8.7%
VS 74 49 73 75 73 70 70 70 4.0%
ZG 38 39 47 50 50 51 55 56 1.4%
ZH (Zurich) 39 39 61 61 63 63 64 62 17.0%
M I N 3 43 63 53 73 44 04 14 9
M A X 7 44 97 37 57 37 07 07 0
MEAN 40 39 49 51 50 51 52 56































Table 1b: Number of large firms and of fringe firms per canton over 1997 - 2000 
canton nlarge nfringe nlarge nfringe nlarge nfringe nlarge nfringe
AG (Aargau) 33 6 33 6 34 9 35 6
AI 33 1 33 3 33 2 33 4
AR 33 5 33 6 33 9 34 3
BE (Bern) 23 6 23 7 25 2 25 7
BL 53 3 43 5 44 5 34 8
BS 33 6 23 7 14 8 15 1
FR 23 7 13 8 15 0 15 4
GE 23 6 23 7 24 7 44 6
GL 33 5 33 6 34 2 34 3
GR 26 9 24 7 35 6 35 3
JU 33 4 33 5 24 0 24 2
LU 33 5 33 6 34 8 35 1
NE 33 5 33 6 24 3 24 7
NW 33 5 33 4 33 9 33 8
OW 33 5 33 6 34 1 34 2
SG (St Gallen) 33 6 33 6 35 0 35 1
SH 43 5 53 4 53 9 54 1
SO 33 6 43 5 44 7 35 2
SZ 33 6 33 6 34 6 34 8
TG 33 6 33 6 34 5 34 7
TI 43 4 33 5 34 3 34 7
UR 33 4 33 3 33 6 33 9
VD (Vaud) 33 6 43 4 44 7 54 7
VS 37 1 24 7 27 1 27 3
ZG 33 5 33 6 34 4 34 7
ZH (Zurich) 43 5 23 7 25 9 25 9
M I N 23 1 13 3 13 2 13 4
M A X 57 1 54 7 57 1 57 3
M E A N 33 8 33 6 34 6 34 8
MEDIAN 3 35 3 36 3 45.5 3 47
1997 1998 1999 2000
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Table 1c:  Inverse of Herfindahl index over 1997- 2000 
 
canton 1997 1998 1999 2000
AG 8.58 8.51 8.57 8.80
AI 5.47 5.51 5.41 5.45
AR 6.15 6.43 6.14 6.33
BE 5.27 5.62 7.16 7.99
BL 10.53 10.94 11.10 11.48
BS 4.45 4.45 4.55 4.69
FR 7.67 7.52 6.86 7.04
GE 14.98 14.70 13.87 13.72
GL 6.64 6.63 6.54 6.78
GR 11.98 7.28 6.23 5.04
JU 5.38 5.30 4.17 4.19
LU 5.59 5.47 5.26 5.27
NE 8.32 9.33 12.40 12.46
NW 6.68 6.46 6.10 6.06
OW 5.72 5.61 5.40 5.50
SG 7.08 7.04 6.81 6.93
SH 8.67 9.26 9.98 10.07
SO 8.90 9.65 9.74 9.65
SZ 6.04 5.79 5.55 5.53
TG 8.39 8.60 7.50 8.29
TI 7.95 8.25 8.47 8.77
UR 4.95 4.80 4.63 4.66
VD 11.72 11.36 11.64 11.84
VS 9.60 9.42 9.29 9.44
ZG 7.43 7.32 7.16 7.24
ZH 9.48 9.86 10.34 10.88  37 
Table 2: Monthly premium differences by year 
 
 
Year  Swiss francs Euros Swiss francs Euros
1997 51.19 32.18 103.97 65.36
1998 47.66 29.96 88.84 55.85
1999 44.71 28.11 95.01 59.73
2000 41.67 26.20 90.00 56.58
2001 45.14 28.38 97.14 61.07
2002 51.77 32.55 110.97 69.76
2003 49.39 31.05 128.34 80.68
2004 47.29 29.73 140.00 88.01














Education level: primary school 11.24
Education level: secondary school 52.05
Education level: apprenticeship 11.28
Education level: professionnal tertiary education 14.10
Education level: university completed 11.28
Urban setting 78.73
Very good subjective health status 35.59
Bad subjective health  16.40
Has opted for a high deductible (either 1200 or 1500 Swiss francs) 14.64
Has a supplementary health insurance  71.98
Has a supplementary health insurance
(except for "division commune Suisse entière") 62.96
Has subscribed to 2 or more health insurance contracts 35.04
Has subscribed to 3 or more health insurance contracts  12.04
Has basic and supplementary coverage 
from 2 different providers 7.00
Has switched between 1996 and 2000 15.2
Intents to switch in the future 9.9
Lives in overwhelming choice (>55) areas in 2000 38.06
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Table 4: Logit Switching Model Estimates (Switch = 1) 
 
Coef z Coef  z Coef  z Coef z Coef z Coef z Coef  z Coef z Coef  z Coef  z Coef  z Coef  z
number of plans (choices) -0.02 -4.4 -0.03 -4.5 -0.03 -3.9 -0.02 -4.4 -0.02 -4.8 -0.01 -3.8
number of plans > 55 -0.43 -3.8
choice: [30 - 49] 0.11 2.1 0.24 2.0 0.20 1.9
choice: [50 - 55] ref ref ref ref ref ref
choice: [56 - 60] -0.22 -1.2 -0.12 -1.4 -0.60 -1.8
choice: [61 - 70] -0.37 -2.2 -0.51 2.2 -0.64 -2.8
number of large firms -0.01 -0.2
number of fringe firms -0.02 -4.3
inverse of herfindahl index -0.07 -2.0
age [18-26] 0.19 1.4 0.19 1.4 0.19 1.4 0.19 1.4 0.19 1.4 0.28 1.4 0.19 1.4 0.20 1.5 0.20 1.5 0.19 1.4 0.26 1.3 0.19 1.4
age [27-35] 0.24 3.3 0.24 3.3 0.24 3.3 0.24 3.3 0.24 3.3 0.23 1.9 0.24 3.3 0.25 3.4 0.24 3.3 0.24 3.3 0.29 2.4 0.24 3.3
age [36-50] ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref
age [51-64] -0.12 -1.5 -0.11 -1.5 -0.12 -1.5 -0.12 -1.5 -0.12 -1.5 0.03 0.2 -0.12 -1.5 -0.12 -1.5 -0.11 -1.5 -0.12 -1.5 -0.12 -1.5 -0.12 -1.5
age 65 + -0.30 -3.1 -0.31 -3.1 -0.31 -3.1 -0.30 -3.1 -0.30 -3.1 -0.26 -1.7 -0.30 -3.1 -0.29 -2.9 -0.31 -3.1 -0.31 -3.1 -0.25 -1.7 -0.29 -3.1
male  <0.01 0.0 <0.01 0.0 <0.01 0.0 <0.01 0.01 <0.01 0.1 0.11 1.2 <0.01<0.01 <0.01 0.0 <0.01 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.1 <0.01 0.0
completed university -0.01 -0.2 -0.01 -0.2 -0.01 -0.1 -0.01 -0.2 -0.02 -0.2 0.09 0.6 -0.01 -0.1 -0.01 -0.1 -0.02 -0.2 -0.01 -0.1 -0.04 -0.4 -0.01 -0.2
urban -0.13 -1.9 -0.14 -1.9 -0.13 -1.9 -0.13 -1.9 -0.13 -1.8 -0.15 -1.3 -0.13 -1.9 -0.13 -1.8 -0.13 -1.9 -0.13 -1.9 -0.12 -1.8 -0.13 -1.9
poor health  -0.08 -0.9 -0.08 -1.0 -0.08 -0.9 -0.08 -1.0 -0.08 -1.0 -0.03 -0.2 -0.08 -0.9 -0.08 -0.9 -0.08 -0.9 -0.08 -0.9 -0.06 -0.6 -0.08 -0.9
high deductible 0.15 2.1 0.15 2.0 0.15 2.0 0.15 2.1 0.15 2.1 0.24 1.9 0.15 2.0 0.15 2.0 0.16 2.1 0.15 2.0 0.14 1.7 0.16 2.1
dp
1 0.02 1.9 0.04 3.6 0.03 2.9 0.02 1.8 0.03 3.1 0.01 1.4 0.02 1.9 0.02 2.0 0.03 2.9 0.03 1.6 0.02 4.1 0.02 1.9
has supplementary insurance
2
-0.09 -1.6 -0.09 -1.6 -0.09 -1.6 -0.09 -1.6 -0.09 -1.6 -0.09 -1.6 -0.09 -1.6 -0.18 -1.4 -0.09 -1.6 -0.08 -1.4 -0.09 -1.6
Year 1997 ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref
Year 1998 0.08 1.0 0.10 1.4 0.09 1.2 0.09 1.1 0.08 1.1 0.21 1.7 0.10 1.5 0.07 1.0 0.09 1.2 0.08 1.1 0.10 1.5 0-09 1.2
Year 1999 -0.36 -1.9 -0.16 -1.5 -0.35 -2.3 -0.35 -1.9 -0.22 -2.3 -0.32 -1.3 -0.04 -0.3 -0.36 -1.9 -0.35 -2.3 -0.38 -2.5 -0.09 -0.9 -0.21 -2.3
Year 2000 -0.53 -2.4 -0.26 -2.0 -0.58 -2.8 -0.53 -2.4 -0.36 -3.2 -0.89 -2.5 -0.14 -1.1 -0.53 -2.4 -0.58 -2.8 -0.62 -2.9 -0.20 -1.7 -0.35 -3.3
household size 0.03 0.8
supp * [30 - 49] 0.09 1.9
supp * [50 - 55] 0.05 1.3
supp * [56 - 60] 0.04 1.3
supp * [61 - 70] ref ref
dp * [30 - 49] <0.01 0.3
dp * [50 - 55] ref ref
dp * [56 - 60] 0.08 1.9
dp * [61 - 70] 0.09 3.1
Number of new funds -0.01 -2.5
Constant -1.66 -5.0 -2.66 -11.1 -1.86 -4.5 -1.68 -4.5 -2.24 -4.8 -1.41 -2.3 -1.52 -5.5 -2.46 -5.9 -1.96 -4.7 -1.62 -3.1 -1.82 -3.2 -2.31 -5.2
canton dummies are included but are not reported in this table
1dp = the standard deviation in health plan premium within a canton
2except for "division commune suisse entière"
Column 1: the number of choice is represented by a continuous variable
Column 2: the number of choice is represented by one dummie variable ( > 55 plans)
Column 3: the number of choices is represented by dummies (Choice: [30 - 49],[50 - 55], [56 - 60], [61 - 70])
Column 4: distinguishes the number of big firms and fringe firms
Column 5: uses the inverse of the Herfindahl index
Column 6: is run on the subsample of those who have not subscribed to a supplementary health insurance contract
Column 7: Instrumenting the continuous number of fund variable by the population of the canton, the average income of the canton and the average premium 
Column 8: the household size is incorporated as a covariate
Column 9 : interaction terms between the choice set and holding a supplementary contract
Column 10: interaction terms between the choice set and dp
Column 11 : Bivariate probit model  (the second equation explains the probability of subscribing a supplementary insurance contract)
Column 12 : incorporates the number of new funds
Column 12 Column 8 Column 9 Column 10 Column 11 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4
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Table 5: Logit Intent to Switch Estimates(Intent to Switch =1) 
123
Choice: [35 - 45] 1,49 1,45 1,53 1,48 1,35 1,35
Choice: [46 - 50] ref ref ref ref ref ref 
Choice: [51 - 55] -0,30 -1,87 -0,31 -1,81 -0,23 -1,57
Choice: [56 - 60] -0,36 -2,11 -0,35 -2,11 -0,32 -1,96
Choice: [61 - 70] -0,23 -2,14 -0,23 -2,12 -0,22 -1,84
age 18-26 0,75 2,43 0,96 3,02 0,77 2,49
age 27-35 0,25 1,32 0,35 1,81 0,28 1,45
age 36-50 ref ref ref ref  ref ref 
age 50-65 -0,45 -2,12 -0,29 -1,31 -0,46 -2,15
Age 65+ -1,87 -4,27 -1,61 -3,60 -1,87 -4,28
male 0,23 1,48 0,26 1,65 0,24 1,55
completed university 0,45 2,12 0,43 2,06 0,44 2,10
urban 0,27 1,28 0,35 1,63 0,22 1,04
Subjective very good health -0,24 -1,50 -0,26 -1,64 -0,24 -1,50
dp 0,02 2,22 0,03 2,12 0,02 2,32
Has a supplementary insurance -0,09 -0,61 -0,09 -0,56 -0,09 -0,58
Duration in plan -0,02 -3,24 -0,02 -3,04 -0,02 -3,16
Household size 0,17 2,78
Number of new plans 1997 - 2000 -0,05 -1,60
constant -1,49 -3,49 -2,19 -4,37 -0,79 -1,2941 
Table 6: Distribution of health plan choices (over the 12 major companies in 2000) 
 
CH 2000 p*
Old enrollees New enrollees
(non switchers) (switchers)
(n = 1743) (n = 312)
helsana zürich       18.93 3.85 15.55% <0,001
css luzern 15.03 9.29 14.99%
visana bern 9.98 3.21 7.67%
konkordia luzern 8.09 3.53 7.51%
swica winterthur 7.17 3.85 6.52%
kpt bern 4.76 4.81 5.33%
sanitas zürich 4.76 7.69 5.29%
intras carouge 3.96 13.14 4.20%
supra lausanne 3.9 2.24 2.93%
wincare winterthur 3.73 0.64 3.93%
Ökk-versicherungen 3.04 4.49 1.75%
assura pully 2.64 9.94 3.48%
Cum 85.99 66.68 79.14%





Table 7: Distribution of health plan choices by age groups 
 
Old enrollees New enrollees Old enrollees New enrollees
(n = 326) (n = 113) (n = 1417) (n = 199)
helsana zürich       14.11 3.54 20.04 4.02
css luzern 13.8 7.08 15.31 10.55
visana bern 5.21 4.42 11.08 2.51
konkordia luzern 8.9 6.19 7.9 2.01
swica winterthur 8.28 5.31 6.92 3.02
kpt bern 3.68 3.54 5.01 5.53
sanitas zürich 9.2 9.73 3.74 6.53
intras carouge 3.99 12.39 3.95 13.57
supra lausanne 2.76 1.77 4.16 2.51
wincare winterthur 2.15 0.88 4.09 0.5
Ökk-versicherungen 3.37 1.77 2.96 6.03
assura pully 3.99 6.19 2.33 12.06
Survey 2000
Age <35 Age > 35
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Table 8:  Stated reasons for maintain the current insurer 
 
Stated reasons for not switching %
Habit, tradition  13.45%
Personal knowledge of the fund manager/representative  0.44%
Remain because of previous use, for solidarity  0.40%
Proximity 0.22%
Comfort 10.06%
It would be the same elsewhere  3.79%
Average sickness fund  1.46%
Satisfied with current solution  35.16%
Good performance  11.51%
Good ratio cost/benefits  8.82%
Good customer service  3.66%
Convenient premiums  2.87%
Slight increase in premiums  1.41%
The current fund provides a different offer 0.31%
Cannot switch 1.76%








Reasons for being insured at the current Lamal Insurer %
Parents have always been there 29.04%




Information obtained from the media  1.24%
Other 21.29%  
 